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updated January 10, 2004 by Phoenix |
Ayn Rand's philosophy of Objectivism has become a significant modern phenomenon in popular philosophy and popular fiction. More than once, I have been asked to distinguish Prometheanism from Objectivism. I always hasten to do so. However, the main intention of this essay is not to distance Prometheanism from Objectivism, through objection to the latter. It is instead to offer to Objectivists some illumination of a greater mission of philosophy from which Rand deviated, a mission which is their rightful home and which Prometheanism now represents. And, it is my intention to offer a place to those who have turned away from Objectivism because of perceptively detecting some of its errors. I feel a certain gratitude toward Objectivism because my first inspiration to change the world through ideas came from reading Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged. Although I felt her ability at writing fiction left something to be desired, I found much of it compelling and inspiring. I interpreted much of its philosophical foundations in adaptable rather than stringent ways, such as 'rationality.' I looked past its flaws as I was searching for a lifeline, any lifeline of attention to the individual and the fulfillment of the individual, amid a morass of collegiate Plato, Hobbes, and Marx. I had not yet read Rand's nonfiction essays. Then I began to read copious amounts of Nietzsche after hearing of his connection to Rand, and I read more Rand, and made a startling discovery. In fact, I had been interpreting Objectivism in my own way. It was impossible to liken Rand to Nietzsche, but only because Rand was a child in comparison (though not in innocence or playfulness). Rand had liberally appropriated Nietzschean principles, methods, symbols, language... almost entirely, everything about Objectivism which had spoken to me was not originally Objectivist but Nietzschean: individualism over collectivism and altruism, human strength over weakness, self-interest, a prominence of mythic symbols, the similar effects of Christianity and socialism, the essential underground influence of ideas, the affirmation of life, the value of what is life-advancing, and on, and on. But she was a dilettante and he was a master, at both philosophy and its expression. It was Nietzsche who had intended his work much as I had interpreted Objectivism based on limited exposure. And she did much more than appropriate his work as her own, she denounced him and barely acknowledged his influence. Nietzsche exposes much philosophical work as an expression of the psychological insecurities and limitations of its creators, and I believe Objectivism is no exception. Perhaps the most telling evidence of Rand's problems is her brutal rejection of Nietzsche after her early years. Her inability to be grateful in retrospect or to fully acknowledge Nietzsche speaks volumes. Much of the difference between Prometheanism and Objectivism is the product of motivational and psychological differences. Rand seemed to be fighting her battles too rigidly for anyone who was not also fighting herself. Quite likely, her heavy emphasis on logic and reason signifies a very common psychological problem, a fear of facing and reconciling her own emotions and feelings. Prometheanism is less intended as a recipe for a better world, than a description of the sorts of people who can prepare the foundations for it and prepare themselves for it. And such a person is unfortunately not like Rand. As a friend once remarked to me: "How can I heal the world, if I cannot heal myself?" This is not to say that I reject reason or logic where its use is appropriate. Reason is a wonderfully useful tool; when a logical process can be used productively, it should be. But logic always requires assumptions to operate. Besides, deliberate applied logic is but one of the critical abilities of the human brain. One other is intuition, in which we cannot easily distinguish between the critical and the creative (or between the rational and the irrational). Reason as a concept does not adequately encompass human creativity or justify it, though creation is essential to us. Nor does reason in itself encompass the inherent assumptions (sometimes one might say 'faith' and sometimes one might say 'instincts') which life requires. There is so much which is perhaps 'irrational' which is a necessary part of us, and often a productive advantage. We may describe and we may analyze, but we will not find these aspects of ourselves to be logically derivable from assumptions we make. Reason does not include everything which is potentially valuable. An illustration of the comparison between Nietzsche and Rand in philosophical scope and ability is the revaluation of all values, one of Nietzsche's greatest and unique achievements. He envisioned the work of the true philosophers of the future as the reexamination of every possible assumption, every possible value in light of its practical impact on life and life's advancement, with creation of ideas based on what is learned. This process in detail, applied especially to society today and in the future, describes the evolution of Prometheanism as it has been accomplished and as it will be accomplished. In contrast, Rand's greatest contribution was probably her exposure of altruism (continuing one part of the larger universe of Nietzsche's revaluation of all values). She popularized her confrontation of altruism and applied it to economics particularly. Altruism as a value is indeed a mistake; at least as a moral value, altruism is against the nature of man. All that the purveyors of altruism promise, from real satisfaction to a social paradise, is not achievable through self-sacrifice or living for others. It is against the nature of man, who lives as an individual much more than as a social animal, to be an altruist. Altruism is a blind alley, altruism is the destruction of potential and achievement and happiness. What altruism promises, self-interest as a path to integrated strength can deliver. It is through a self-interested pursuit of one's own goals, satisfaction at existence through self-expression, and the perfection and strength of an individual focused on himself, that men and women arise who feel themselves to be so much that it is natural for them to give of themselves — they feel there is always more to give. But they do not do it for others, they do it because it has become their nature. There has never been a true altruist, and there never will be. A true altruist would be inhuman. Many who have been called great altruists have simply been strong men and women, who gave of themselves nothing more essential than the excess of an unquenchable fountain. The fountain still remained — they never gave of their own source. But Objectivist egoism does not comprise a philosophical end in itself (or a moral end in itself, as Rand would say). Rand's formula, "a man's life is an end in itself," may be a good way to express a critique of altruism, but it is really just the beginning to say this. For a man to focus on his own life, is a beginning. Then — what will he do with it? Prometheanism, in contrast, follows the Nietzschean precedent and examines the basic question of what has practical value, a question which is answered in part by the idea that one's own life is the source for value, and then invites Prometheanists to join a crusade to further that value in the world. As much as Rand was interested in practicality, she seems to have had little knowledge of what to do with her philosophy. In particular, her acceptance of established political infrastructure demonstrates an inability to apply Objectivism, not to mention some hypocrisy, and not a little naiveté. Given Rand's recognition of the oppression of self-sacrificial morality, I wonder how she could not go just a bit further, and see that morality of any kind can in itself become something to enforce which suppresses the individual. But she did not, and her own Objectivism became that which it detested. What is distinctly Randian in Objectivism is twofold: her particular tone, which is too often alienating, uncompromising and self-righteous, and her retrogressive fusion of an Aristotelian obsession with reason with a purist, fundamentalist morality. Both are quite recognizable in her closed-mindedness to what might be learned from non-western cultures, and her clannish attitudes which condemned all those outside her circle, and periodically purged it of those she found untrue to her vision. As much as I may agree with many specific points that Rand makes, I find it difficult (as do many) to approve wholeheartedly even if I agree with a given point. The root of this goes beyond specific arguments with elements of her philosophy, it also extends to aesthetics. If I read her novels, I cannot approve of the way she presents herself and her ideas, and my disapproval blurs the line between reasonable evaluation of her points and aesthetic feelings. We must realize that a very great amount of our reactions based on judgement are dependent on personal aesthetic taste. Presentation and tone mingle with our own associations, affecting us in a way inextricable from those evaluative processes we call 'logical.' There is no line, except as we artificially draw it. And here we come to a fundamental difficulty in her thinking. It is impossible for anyone to separate one's own subjectivity from judgement. She believed it was possible. She believed in the independence of a rational function in man. But there is no such thing as a man or woman who can separate reason from identity, an identity which includes instincts and incorporated impulses which produce, among other things, aesthetic reaction. This is why Rand's attempts to depict purely rational men produce wooden and unrealistic characters. In fact, it would not even be desirable to be a rational person in such a strict sense, in order to be fully realized as an individual; individuality requires subjectivity. In a philosophy, I believe that only subjectivity of perspective can really justify the necessity of individualism. And I believe subjectivity of perspective is true in a practical (not objective) sense. To me nothing is absolutely objective. Nor does this matter. The only thing that matters is what is life-advancing and beneficial, be it fluid, rigid, reality, appearance, true, false or anything else. As a Promethean I do not care about always pursuing objective truth even if it does exist, unless it is always beneficial. And I cannot conceive of any substantive explanation for why, if it did exist, it would always be beneficial, as in Rand's assertion that objective men have no conflicts of interest. When I realized all of this, with Nietzsche's assistance, I realized I could not be an 'Objectivist.' A specific example from Rand's books: I find many of her aesthetic arguments in The Fountainhead appealing, particularly her application of "form follows function" as this is my favorite artistic principle. But I do not accept that my approval is evidence for a rationality in accordance with her pretension to an objective standard with which to judge aesthetics. That would be arrogance, since rationality and being objective only have meaning across shared assumptions. Shared assumptions can be unlikely or impossible for individuals with necessarily different and subjective perspectives. Objectivity does not have meaning in an all-encompassing cosmic sense. A person can meaningfully be objective in relation to another only according to a set of agreed criteria, preferably those which are demonstrable according to practical standards. Or, one can appear objective because one lacks personal attachment and basically lacks the interest to perceive and act at all, thereby avoiding subjectivity. A dogged pursuit of super-objectivity is as destructive to the independent self as abandoning reason altogether, even when it has meaning as a tool. Nietzsche might have called Rand a disciple who had lost her way, alluding to his mock-biblical Thus Spoke Zarathustra. She was not one of his presaged philosophers of the future, self-honesty being a chief requirement. In her desperate affection for the objective (and unspecific) self, exemplified by her unmemorable heroes Howard Roark and John Galt, Rand lost her way from the path of individualism she also so desperately sought. It is no coincidence that both The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged feature prominent characterizations of strong femininity, Dominique Francon and Dagny Taggart, who are nevertheless vulnerable and inadequate and in search of their rational mates. Rand's own search for the objective ideal was as desperate as any search for the external, objective validation of God. In a fascinating and ironic parallel to many who have sought religion, despite Rand's capacities and strong will, she looked outside herself for validation because she felt unable to stand alone on her own subjective validation. She looked with too much faith to Reason as the ultimate objective authority she unconsciously needed. It is not surprising that Objectivism as a philosophical school has experienced many of the same symptoms inherent in organized religion: defensive dogmatism, clannish behavior, condemnation of unbelievers, and even the excommunication of prominent members for their unorthodoxy. Tragically, Rand was not strong enough to look at herself honestly, and see that much of her philosophy was a reflection of herself rather than of an objective authority: 'truth.' Recognition of personal investment in devising and interpreting philosophy is very important in order to avoid the prices of self-deceit. A reader may react positively to Rand, and have the proper mindset at the proper time to find Rand's books quite valuable and productive as a stage in their development, especially a reader who needs firm redirection to reevaluate the worth of self-interest. Other readers will experience an adverse effect, even if they can recognize that worth, because Rand's strictness of understanding will fit them much like a straitjacket. I have gone through both reactions. But I am still disposed favorably toward Rand for providing an important stepping stone in my philosophical development, a stepping stone to the larger mission of recognizing and creating what is life-advancing. This mission has become my work with Prometheanism. I outgrew Rand, and moved on, but I choose to fondly remember my early experience with her work.
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